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intelligence were distinguished. Amentia is a lack of intelligence, whereas hysteria is a lack of sagacity.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Manuel de Psychiatrie.* J. ROUGUES DE FURSAC. Cinquième Edition. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1917. Pp. 509.

Treatises on psychiatry may be divided into several classes—*viz.*:

1. Systems of psychiatry of a really creative and constructive type, like Kraepelin's work with its successive modifications and additions.

2. The less elaborate text-book, yet still bearing the stamp of originality, such as the treatises of Krafft-Ebing, Tanzi and Biachi.

3. Contributions to psychiatry which are interpretative rather than descriptive of mental disorders, such as Bleuler's monumental works on dementia præcox and schizophrenic negativism and Freud's interpretation of the paranoiac mechanism.

4. Text-books intended primarily for the student, where interpretation is sacrificed for description and where mental diseases are more or less classified like a botanical herbarium. It is to this latter class that the book under review belongs.

The fact that this book has gone through five editions in the original and several editions in English translation attests to its popularity, and for a brief treatise on mental disorders, written with the usual clearness of French medical works, we know of no more satisfactory work. Its chief fault is that it is too descriptive and not sufficiently interpretative and is apt to leave the student with a feeling that mental diseases are cut and dried entities like different varieties of trees and that the symptoms of mental diseases are the more or less haphazard and accidental vagaries of a disordered mind. Modern psychiatric analyses have shown that the content of a psychosis is not a wild and disordered outbreak of mental symptoms, but is either the logical outcome of a failure to adapt the personality to new situations in life or arises from circumstances and conditions of which the individual is unaware, that is, an unconscious mechanism. Careful psychological analyses can establish these principles beyond a doubt, such as the reviewer has done, for instance, the psychoanalysis of the somnambulism of Lady Macbeth.

Psychiatry has long ago passed the point of mere clinical description and attempts at various classifications, since the former was

bound to mislead and the latter often reached a point of artificiality, based either on pathological evidence, on the course of the disease or on a more or less illusory grouping of symptoms. It has reached the more fertile ground where the content of the psychosis is being carefully interpreted, as has been done so well by the psychoanalytic school. For instance, in the book under review, in the descriptions of the sexual perversions and the psychoneuroses, nothing is said about the etiology of these disorders beyond a vague reference to "heredity" and "general enfeeblement of the organism," whatever these terms may connote; neither is there any reference to the remarkable curative results of psychoanalysis.

The section on the prevention of mental diseases is one of the best and most comprehensive in the book. The account of the efforts in various countries to enforce prohibition along legislative and educational lines is admirable, likewise the insistence placed upon the susceptibility of different individuals to varying amounts of alcohol.

The classification of Kraepelin is followed in the main, as being the most logical of recent attempts, the result of years of clinical experience, although the paranoiac states are given their usual French designation. It is doubtful if there exists a pure exhaustion psychosis any more than a so-called nervous exhaustion, and happily the latter is being gradually relegated to the limbo of forgotten theories, a fate which will probably soon overtake the so-called psychoses of exhaustion.

He adopts Bleuler's term of "schizophrenia" instead of dementia præcox, as expressing more clearly the exact nature of the disorder. Unfortunately he does not mention Bertschinger's remarkable contribution to the processes of recovery in schizophrenia. It is well known that a certain percentage of these cases get well, but *how* they get well and *why* some recover and some do not, is a most important question even for the student, and it is hoped that this serious omission will be attended to in a future edition. In the section on the nature of the disease no mention is made of Bleuler's really epoch-making contributions to the inner mechanism of schizophrenia and schizophrenic negativism, on which all future psychotherapy of dementia præcox must be based. To state that the treatment of dementia præcox is purely symptomatic, as is done in this book, is a failure to appreciate the really curative results in early cases of the disease by the psychoanalytic method of treatment.

The portions devoted to the paranoia question are likewise inadequate, since there are omitted the essential mental mechanisms which underlie every paranoiac state and which form the basis of the paranoiac misinterpretation of actual occurrences. As a contrast, the chapter on paresis is admirable from a clinical and pathological

standpoint, but here again there is no mention of the attempts at a specific therapy of the disorder, which, while not curative, at least seems to retard the progress of the disease.

On the whole, however, the book is a good one for the student of psychiatry who has had no previous training on the subject, and yet even the student will in time, if he observes and reads, be interested less in artificial classifications and more in psychological interpretations of mental diseases, on which the progress of psychiatry, now as in the future, must be based.

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*Naturalism and Agnosticism*: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the Years 1896-98. JAMES WARD. Fourth Edition. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd. 1915.

This edition differs from its predecessors mainly in the fact that the twenty lectures now appear in one volume. In order to make the volume convenient to handle the detailed table of contents has been omitted. The rather full index makes the loss one easily borne. Besides making numerous small emendations the author has added about a dozen explanatory notes.

But nothing important has been done to bring the work up to date. Of course those who regarded the author's criticism of agnosticism and naturalism as definitive when it first appeared will maintain that the book is as much up to date now as it ever was. These lectures were not intended to develop a positive contribution to philosophy; the contribution that Professor Ward has to make to philosophy is given in *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism*, the Gifford Lectures of 1907-10, published in 1911. The particular set of lectures now before us again is almost entirely critical, and it might be said that the views discussed and found wanting have not changed since they were subjected to the unsympathetic examination given them by Professor Ward. Such a statement would hardly do justice to the facts. Mechanism and naturalism have changed very considerably in the meanwhile; and if they have by this change ceased to be mechanism and naturalism, there is at least something left as the result of this change. This something remains to be disposed of before a philosophy can gracefully recommend itself to the world on the ground of the failure of all its rivals.

One need only refer, for example, to Professor Jennings's work in the philosophy of biology to find a view that is not naturalistic and mechanistic in Professor Ward's sense of the term, but neither is it anything like Mr. Ward's teleology. The same may be said of Dewey's naturalism.